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I. OPENING KICKOFF - INTRODUCTION 
“We’re consumers. We are by-products of a lifestyle 
obsession. Murder, crime, poverty, these things don’t 
concern me.”1 
 1. FIGHT CLUB (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1999). 
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Recently, all it took to play in the National Football League 
(NFL) was superior athletic ability and prowess, as NFL 
management was reluctant to discipline NFL players involved in 
criminal acts and other problems off the field.2  As late as the 
1990s, “murder” was the only criminal offense said to bar an athlete 
from playing in the NFL.3  This reluctance to discipline players 
allowed the NFL to continue to feed the public’s obsession with 
football by showcasing the best physically skilled players on the 
field.4  Feeding this obsession eventually led to the NFL’s 
emergence as the richest and most profitable sports league in the 
world.5 
In today’s information age, however, a player’s off-field 
misconduct is under the microscope.6  The off-field misconduct is 
subject to increasing scrutiny partly because of the news media’s 
blasting of the latest scandals and partly because of the nature of 
the offenses.7  Lately, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell’s docket 
contains a wide assortment of matters, including Michael Vick’s 
involvement in illegal dogfighting,8 an assistant coach arrested for 
allegedly driving naked through a fast-food pickup window,9 and 
 2. Cf. Ellen E. Dabbs, Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence Against Women, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 167, 176 (1998) (discussing the rare instances in which 
commissioners used their powers to discipline players involved in sexual assault or 
domestic violence). 
 3. JEFF BENEDICT & DON YAEGER, PROS AND CONS: THE CRIMINALS WHO PLAY IN 
THE NFL 40 (1998) (“[T]he authors asked player agent Leigh Steinberg if there 
were any criminal offenses that would altogether bar a player from playing in the 
NFL.  ‘Murder,’ he replied . . . .”). 
 4. Cf. id. at 5 (suggesting that NFL teams will forgive habitual criminal 
offenders if they can run forty yards in less than 4.3 seconds). 
 5. In 2006, the NFL’s mean operating income was $17.8 million out of $204 
million in revenue.  Kurt Badenhausen, Michael K. Ozanian & Christina Settimi, 
The Business of Football, FORBES.com, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/ 
business/2007/09/13/nfl-team-valuations-biz-07nfl_cz_kb_mo_cs_0913nfl_land. 
html. 
 6. See Sean Bukowski, Flag on the Play: 25 to Life for the Offense of Murder, 3 
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 106, 108 (2001) (noting that athletes are high-profile 
public figures, in which every aspect of their lives draws media attention). 
 7. See Stuart Elliott, Mending a Bruised Image, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at C1 
(explaining that news coverage of professional football reads more like a police 
blotter). 
 8. See Michael S. Schmidt & Judy Battista, After Plea, Vick Is Barred Indefinitely 
by the N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007, at D1 (reporting that Atlanta Falcons’ star 
quarterback, Michael Vick, agreed to plead guilty to felony charges stemming 
from placing dogfighting bets and helping to kill underperforming dogs). 
 9. See Sports Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at D7 (reporting that on 
August 24, 2007, police stopped Joe Cullen, assistant coach of the Detroit Lions, 
3
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the New England Patriots videotaping their opponent’s signals 
during games.10 
Goodell’s ability to discipline this wide-range of incidents 
derives from two categories of conduct listed in the NFL’s 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA): “conduct on the playing 
field . . . [and] conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public 
confidence in, the game of professional football . . . .”11  Moreover, 
to handle players’ off-the-field misconduct specifically, the NFL 
decided to implement a conduct policy in 2000, making it the first 
among major sports.12  Since that time, conduct policies are 
becoming more popular among individual teams in the NFL,13 as 
well as collegiate athletic departments.14 
This article supports the NFL’s current enforcement of its 
conduct policy, and explains its emergence in four parts.  First, this 
note details the NFL’s conduct policy and disciplinary action in the 
NFL.15  Second, it provides a historical evolution of sports 
commissioners’ broad disciplinary powers.16  Third, it explains why 
Roger Goodell’s current enforcement of the NFL’s conduct policy 
and cited him on suspicion of indecent and obscene conduct.  The police said he 
was driving nude.  In a separate incident one week later, Cullen was arrested for 
drunken driving). 
 10. See Richard Sandomir, Goodell Defends Punishment and Warns of Other 
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at D2 (reporting that on September 9, 2007 
the New England Patriots used a video camera in violation of league rules to spy 
on the New York Jets’ defensive signals). 
 11. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS 
ASSOCIATION, art. XI, § 1, para. a, at 20 (2006), available at  http://www.nflplayers. 
com/user/template.aspx?fmid=181&lmid=231&pid=0&type=l [hereinafter NFL-
CBA]. 
 12. See Plus: Pro Football – Owners Meeting; Changes Approved on Player Conduct, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2000, at D7 (stating that the NFL renamed the Violent Crime 
Policy the Personal Conduct Policy). 
 13. In 2005, the Minnesota Vikings implemented a seventy-seven page 
conduct policy following the Minnetonka Boat Cruise Incident, which resulted in 
four players being charged with lewd conduct.  Mark Maske & Les Carpenter, 
Player Arrests Put the NFL in a Defensive Mode: High Number Alarms League as it Works to 
Protect Its Image, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2006, at A1. 
 14. Florida State University’s Athletic Department used its code of conduct to 
suspend Geno Hayes and Joe Surratt indefinitely following their arrests for an 
altercation with the Tallahassee Police Department on September 21, 2007.  
Andrew Carter, Bowden Holds Off on Hayes, Surratt, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 25, 
2007, at D8. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
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is legal, just, and the best for the business.17  Finally, the note 
includes recommendations for the NFL to improve its conduct 
policy before concluding on the current state of athletes’ conduct 
in major sports.18 
II. FIRST DOWN – HANDLING MISCHIEF IN THE NFL 
A. Disciplinary Action 
The NFL Commissioner may discipline players, coaches, and 
other employees for misconduct taking place on and off the field.19  
On-the-field misconduct usually includes players being 
unnecessarily violent or celebrating excessively during games.20  
Off-the-field misconduct usually includes players using banned 
substances, gambling, or engaging in criminal activity.21  In 
response, the commissioner may punish players using any number 
of various NFL documents in his disciplinary arsenal.22  Currently, 
NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell’s weapon of choice in fighting 
off-the-field misconduct is the league’s conduct policy. 
B. NFL’s Conduct Policy 
The NFL and the National Football League Players Association 
(NFLPA) did not collectively bargain for the conduct policy during 
labor negotiations.  Moreover, the conduct policy is not part of the 
league’s constitution and bylaws.  This does not mean, however, 
that the league unilaterally imposed the conduct policy without any 
input from the NFLPA.23  Nevertheless, the NFL’s conduct policy is 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. NFL-CBA, supra note 11, art. XI, § 1, para. (a), at 20. 
 20. “Unnecessary roughness” is a personal foul and “excessive celebrations” 
are unsportsmanlike conduct; both infractions are fifteen-yard penalties enforced 
against the offending team.  2006 Official Playing Rules of the National Football 
League, http://blogmedia.thenewstribune.com/media/2006%20NFL%20RULE 
BOOK.pdf. 
 21. See Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 177 
(1995) (discussing that integrity-related discipline includes issues like gambling, 
drugs, and other off-the-field conduct). 
 22. The league constitution, uniform player contract, and the collective 
bargaining agreement are all governing documents granting the commissioner 
disciplinary authority over off-the-field conduct. 
 23. See Ken Murray, Goodell Gets Tough: Commissioner Looks to Shore Up NFL’s 
Tarnished Image, Cracks Down on ‘Pacman’ Jones, Henry for Repeated Arrests, BALT. SUN, 
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one of the league’s rules and regulations.24  Specifically, the 
conduct policy states in part: 
Engaging in violent and/or criminal activity is 
unacceptable and constitutes conduct detrimental to the 
integrity of and public confidence in the National 
Football League.  Such conduct alienates the fans on 
whom the success of the League depends and has negative 
and sometimes tragic consequences for both the victim 
and the perpetrator.  The League is committed to 
promoting and encouraging lawful conduct and to 
providing a safe and professional workplace for its 
employees.25 
1. Categorizing Misconduct 
The conduct policy categorizes three types of conduct subject 
to discipline: prohibited conduct, persons charged with criminal 
activity, and persons convicted of criminal activity.26  First, 
prohibited conduct entails “covered persons”27 engaging in (or 
aiding, abetting or conspiring to engage in or to incite) “violent 
and/or criminal activity.”28  The policy also includes a non-exclusive 
list of examples constituting “violent and/or criminal activity.”29  
Apr. 11, 2007, at 1E (quoting NFLPA executive director Gene Upshaw, “[w]e 
believe that these are steps that the commissioner needs to take and we support 
the policy.”); see also David Elfin, On Top of His Game: Goodell’s First Nine Months on 
Job Have Been Busy, WASH. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at C1 (discussing that Goodell 
established a six-player advisory council, in which he receives direct input from the 
players on various issues.  One player on the panel said, “[e]veryone who was in 
that initial meeting pretty much anticipated what he was going to do about the off-
the-field problems that we have been having.”). 
 24. Other league rules and regulations include agent regulations, banned 
substances, and financial advisor regulations.  NFL Rules and Regulations, available 
at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.aspx?fmid=181&lmid=232&pid=0& 
type=l. 
 25. NFL Conduct Policy, available at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/ 
template.aspx?fmid=181&lmid=336&pid=0&type=n. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. (stating that NFL players under contract are not the only ones 
considered “covered persons” under the policy).  “Covered persons” also includes 
full-time employees of the NFL or its member teams, rookie players once selected 
in the NFL College Draft, and all other prospective employees once they 
commence negotiations for employment.  Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  The policy states: 
[A]ny crime involving the use or threat of physical violence to a person 
or persons; the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime; 
6
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Moreover, the league prohibits using “words or conduct 
suggest[ing] that criminal conduct is acceptable or condoned 
within the NFL.”30 
Second, persons simply charged with criminal activity are 
subject to disciplinary action and mandatory clinical evaluations 
and counseling.31  Third, the commissioner may fine or suspend a 
person convicted of criminal activity.32  Additionally, multiple 
convictions or violations of the policy result in an automatic 
suspension or banishment determined at the discretion of the 
commissioner.33  The league acknowledges that its players and 
coaches are public role models and states that the NFL is 
“committed to promoting and encouraging lawful conduct.”34  By 
stating this, the league is rationalizing that off-the-field misconduct 
affects the integrity and popularity of the league.35 
2. Procedure 
First, the commissioner must discover prohibited conduct.  
Under the NFL’s policy, the duty of reporting prohibited conduct 
rests on the violator.36  The violator must report any arrests or 
charges of prohibited conduct to their clubs or NFL Security.37  In 
today’s information age, however, access to news around the clock 
can make reporting an unnecessary procedure.  Nevertheless, it is 
the commissioner’s duty to investigate any reports of prohibited 
conduct and ultimately decide whether to impose disciplinary 
action.38  In cases where conduct goes unreported, the 
possession or distribution of a weapon in violation of state or federal law; 
involvement in “hate crimes” or crimes of domestic violence; theft, 
larceny or other property crimes; sex offenses; racketeering; money 
laundering; obstruction of justice; resisting arrest; fraud; and violent or 
threatening conduct. 
Id. 
 30. Id. (alteration in original). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See generally NFL-CBA, supra note 11, art. XI (describing the 
commissioner’s disciplinary authority). 
7
Ambrose: The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its Conduct
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
3. AMBROSE - ADC 4/23/2008  1:20:23 PM 
1076 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3 
 
commissioner may investigate possible prohibited conduct on his 
own initiative.39 
3. Disciplinary Action 
Under the conduct policy, the commissioner has discretion to 
fine, suspend, or banish players.40  Upon reaching a decision, the 
commissioner notifies the player of any disciplinary action through 
a written letter; the NFL also sends a copy of the letter to the 
NFLPA.41  The player disciplined then has the right to appeal the 
commissioner’s decision within twenty days.42  The appeal to the 
commissioner is the offender’s only right to appeal in the NFL, 
unlike other major sports which allow appeals to a neutral third 
party.43 
a. April 10, 2007 
On April 10, 2007, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell decided 
to strengthen the league’s conduct policy.44  Goodell did not 
drastically change the policy language, but he put everyone on 
notice regarding how he would enforce it.45  Goodell warned that 
he would discipline violators with longer suspensions and larger 
fines.46  He also stated that he would hold those employed at the 
club and league levels accountable under the new policy by 
 39. NFL Conduct Policy, supra note 25. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  See also infra Parts IV.A.4.a. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Mike Reiss, Jones Takes Hit from NFL: Titan Suspended for 2007 Season, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11, 2007, at 5D (recapping Goodell’s press conference 
regarding the strengthening of the NFL’s conduct policy). 
 45. Compare NFL Conduct Policy, supra note 25 (showing that the only major 
language change in the policy occurs under the subdivision Persons Charged with 
Criminal Activity, which requires those arrested for or charged with prohibited 
conduct to undergo, “an immediate, mandatory clinical evaluation and, if 
directed, appropriate counseling.  Such evaluation and counseling must be 
performed under the direction and supervision of the NFL Vice President of 
Player and Employee Development.”) and NFL Personal Conduct Policy (Mar. 13, 
2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2798214 (showing that the 
language of the policy prior to April 10, 2007 required “a consultation and 
additional counseling as directed” for persons arrested for or charged with 
prohibited conduct).  Therefore, the policy’s only major substantive change is the 
immediacy of a mandatory clinical evaluation and its supervision by a superior 
league official for those persons violating prohibited conduct. 
 46. See Reiss, supra note 44 (noting that Goodell promised harsher penalties). 
8
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subjecting teams to discipline for club employee violations.47  
Goodell immediately backed up his words with significant action. 
On April 10, 2007, Roger Goodell handed down some of the 
harshest suspensions for off-the-field misconduct in NFL history.48  
Goodell suspended Tennessee Titans’ cornerback Adam “Pacman” 
Jones for the entire 2007 season and suspended Cincinnati 
Bengals’ receiver Chris Henry for eight games.49  Technically, 
Goodell suspended Jones and Henry for their numerous 
encounters with law enforcement prior to April 10, 2007.50  
 47. See Michael O’Keefe, Pacman Packs it in for Year: Jones Can Return, Victim 
Never Will, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 11, 2007, at 57 (explaining that a team’s 
punishment could include a loss of draft choices). 
 48. See Jarrett Bell, NFL Comes Down Hard on Jones, Henry: Titan Suspended for 
Season, Bengal for Eight Games, U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 11, 2007, at 1C (discussing the 
commissioner’s suspension of Jones and Henry as two of the harshest suspensions 
in NFL history for off-the-field conduct). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Greg Garber, Pacman Jones Incidents (Apr. 10, 2007), http://sports.espn. 
go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2790090.  Jones’ nine separate incidents since being 
drafted in April 2005: 
• 07/13/05:  Jones is arrested by Nashville police at Titans headquarters and 
charged with assault and felony vandalism stemming from a nightclub 
altercation. 
• 09/05/05:  Jones has a loud verbal tantrum when told to wait in line for his 
car and he did not pay for valet service while attending the annual Nashville 
Sports Council Kickoff Luncheon. 
• 10/25/05:  State of West Virginia alleges that Jones violated the terms of his 
probation; a judge extends his probation ninety days. 
• 02/06/06:  “Jones is arrested in Fayetteville, Ga., and charged with 
possession of marijuana.  He is handcuffed after throwing a punch at an 
officer . . . and charged with a felony count of obstruction and two 
misdemeanors of obstructing police.”  The court dropped the possession of 
marijuana charge in January 2007; the court still has not set a trial date for 
the obstruction charge. 
• 03/23/06:  “A Fayette County drug task force SWAT team serves a search 
warrant at the Georgia home Jones bought for his mother. . . . Jones admits 
to police he has been smoking and that it will be several weeks before he is 
able to pass a drug test.” 
• 04/18/06:  “According to Nashville police, who cite surveillance camera 
footage, Jones is one of 12 people gathered at a gas station when a fight 
breaks out and gunshots are fired.” 
• 08/25/06:  “Jones is arrested in Murfreesboro, Tenn., for disorderly conduct 
and public intoxication.  At the Sweetwater Saloon, he is accused of assault 
by Toya Garth, who says Jones spit in her face and she spit back.” 
• 10/26/06:  “Jones is cited for misdemeanor assault at Club Mystic, a 
Nashville nightclub, where he allegedly spits in the face of a female college 
student.  He is suspended for one game by the Titans . . . .” 
• 02/19/07:  “Jones is present when an early morning brawl breaks out at 
Minxx Gentlemen’s Club in Las Vegas.  Three people are shot.  Club co-
9
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Goodell’s new strict enforcement laid the groundwork for handling 
the Michael Vick situation later in 2007. 
b. Michael Vick 
On July 17, 2007, the news media was abuzz as a federal grand 
jury indicted Atlanta Falcons quarterback and All-Pro, Michael 
Vick.51  The grand jury charged Vick with sponsoring a dogfighting 
operation named “Bad Newz Kennels.”52  Six days later, Roger 
Goodell instructed Vick to stay away from the Falcons training 
camp until the league reviewed the charges.53  The league also 
asked the Atlanta Falcons, as a club, to refrain from taking action 
against Vick until the league completed its investigation.54  
Although the Falcons had the right to discipline Vick,55 the league’s 
disciplinary action supersedes any individual club’s action.56 
On July 26, 2007, Vick pleaded not guilty to the dogfighting 
charges.57  At the time, the commissioner faced two basic concerns 
that arise when employers discipline employees.  First, the 
owner Robert Susnar claims the shooter—still at large—acted on Jones’ 
behalf.  Jones denies this.”   
Id.  Jones currently faces two felony charges of coercion from this incident.  
Michael O’Keeffe, Pacman Backed Into a Corner: Faces Felony Charges in Vegas Shooting, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 21, 2007, at 68.  See also James Alder, James’ Football Blog: 
The Chris Henry Weekly Rap Sheet (June 15, 2006), 
http://football.about.com/b/a/257717.htm (describing the nature of Henry’s 
four arrests in a fourteen month span: (1) alleged possession of marijuana; (2) 
waived a gun at a crowd of people; (3) drove under the influence; and (4) 
provided alcohol to three females under the age of eighteen). 
 51. Indictment, United States v. Michael Vick et al., Criminal No. 3:07CR 
(E.D. Va. July 17, 2007), available at http://assets.espn.go.com/media/pdf/070 
717/vick_indictment.pdf. 
 52. See Michael S. Schmidt, In the Case Against Vick, Dogs Are Held as Evidence, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at D1 (discussing that prosecutors used the fifty-four pit 
bulls recovered by law enforcement to indict Vick on felony charges). 
 53. See Clifton Brown & Judy Battista, Vick Goes to Court as Falcons Go to Camp, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at D1 (describing the commissioner ordering Vick to stay 
away from camp and the Falcons adjusting to life without Vick). 
 54. See Judy Battista, Team Owner Says Falcons Planned to Suspend Vick, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2007, at D2 (explaining Atlanta Falcons’ owner Arthur Blank’s 
decision-making process on whether to suspend Vick). 
 55. See NFL-CBA, supra note 11, art. VIII, § 1, para. a, at 11 (noting that the 
club may discipline a player for conduct detrimental to the club). 
 56. Id. at art. XI, § 5, at 20. 
 57. Judy Battista, Without Contact, Vick Takes Hit in the Pocket, N.Y. TIMES, July 
28, 2007, at D1. 
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commissioner had to afford Vick due process. 58  This did not mean 
Goodell had to wait for the legal system to adjudicate Vick, but it 
did mean Goodell had to grant Vick due process by providing a 
meaningful notice and hearing.59  Second, Goodell had to avoid 
prejudicing the legal action against Vick.60  Completely ignoring 
these two concerns can lead the commissioner into the court room 
as a defending party.61 
On August 23, 2007, less than one month after Vick pled not 
guilty, Vick reconsidered and signed a plea agreement admitting 
his involvement in the dogfighting operation.62  The next day, after 
the government filed Vick’s plea, Goodell suspended Vick 
indefinitely.63  According to league policy, Goodell notified Vick 
and the NFLPA of the suspension through the required letter.64  In 
the letter, Goodell explained that Vick violated the league’s 
conduct policy and his player’s contract.65  Goodell noted that he 
would review Vick’s status following the conclusion of his legal 
proceedings, and offered Vick the right to appeal.66  In the NFL’s 
disciplinary system, the commissioner plays the roles of prosecutor, 
judge, and jury.67  This unusual amalgamation of power is owed to 
 58. See Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of 
Professional Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the 
Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1430–32 (1990) (discussing due process 
constraints on commissioner actions). 
 59. See id. at 1432 (“Where notice and a hearing are not supplied, courts will 
be quick to condemn commissioner actions.”). 
 60. See Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 924, 928–29 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (issuing a 
temporary restraining order against the commissioner’s investigations and hearing 
into Rose’s alleged gambling because Commissioner Giamatti prejudged Rose’s 
case). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Elliot, supra note 7, at C1 (noting that Michael Vick pleaded guilty to a 
felony charge of conspiracy deriving from illegal dog fighting); see also Plea 
Agreement, United States v. Michael Vick, Criminal No. 3:07CR274 (E.D. Va. Aug. 
24, 2007), available at http://assets.espn.go.com/media/pdf/070824/vickplea.pdf. 
 63. Michael S. Schmidt & Judy Battista, After Plea, Vick is Barred Indefinitely by 
the N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007, at D1.  See also Letter from Roger Goodell, 
Comm’r, Nat’l Football League, to Michael Vick (Aug. 24, 2007) [hereinafter 
Goodell Letter], available at http://assets.espn.go.com/media/pdf/070824/ 
michaelvickletter.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Bukowski, supra note 6, at 113 (noting that an NFL commissioner can 
act as the “judge, jury, and executioner.”). 
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Major League Baseball, which shaped the broad commissioner 
authority seen in professional sports today.68 
III. SECOND AND LONG – EVOLUTION OF COMMISSIONERS’ BROAD 
POWERS 
A. MLB Shapes Commissioner Authority 
Baseball created the office of the commissioner in 1921,69  and 
its eventual success with the position ultimately led other major 
sports to follow suit and create their own commissioners.70  But, 
baseball is the sport primarily responsible for shaping today’s 
commissioners’ powers, partly due to various legal battles testing 
the scope of the commissioners’ authority.71 
1. Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 1921 – 1944 
“In the early days of baseball, open gambling was as common 
as a well-executed sacrifice bunt.  Gamblers filled the stands and 
bet on everything, including individual at bats.”72  This type of 
behavior, including the infamous Black Sox Scandal73 and the case 
American League Baseball Club of New York v. Johnson,74 gave baseball’s 
 68. See Pachman, supra note 58, at 1413 (noting that “baseball, of all the 
sports, is the best vehicle to examine the genesis of the commissioner’s office.”). 
 69. See id. at 1413 n.19 (stating that Landis was appointed the first 
commissioner of major league baseball in 1921). 
 70. See id. at 1417 n.55 (stating that the NFL changed its president’s title to 
commissioner in 1941, and the NBA named Maurice Podoloff its first 
commissioner in 1949); see also Jason M. Pollack, Note, Take My Arbitrator, Please: 
Commissioner “Best Interests” Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1645, 1647 n.14 (1999) (explaining that the National Hockey League did not 
name its first commissioner, Gary Bettman, until 1992). 
 71. Pachman, supra note 58, at 1420–27. 
 72. Wayne S. Quirk, Baseball’s Big Inning: The Sacrifice of the 1919 Black Sox, in 
SPORTS AND THE LAW, MAJOR LEGAL CASES 111, 113 (Charles E. Quirk ed., 1996). 
 73. See Pachman, supra note 58, at 1413–14 & n.20, (citing ELIOT ASINOF, 
EIGHT MEN OUT 39–121 (Henry Holt & Co. 1963) (1987) (explaining the Black 
Sox scandal, which involved eight Chicago White Sox players who were accused of 
accepting gamblers’ money to “throw” the 1919 World Series)). 
 74. 179 N.Y.S. 498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1919).  In 1919, Boston Red Sox pitcher Carl 
Mays unknowingly tested the powers of the Major League Baseball’s commission 
when he walked off the field in the middle of a game.  Id. at 499–500.  This 
resulted in the Boston Red Sox selling Mays to the New York Yankees and the 
major league baseball commission subsequently suspending Mays for deserting his 
team.  Id. at 501.  American League Baseball Club of New York v. Johnson immediately 
ensued and the court held that the league could only discipline a player for his 
12
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image a black eye and prompted Baseball to create the 
commissioner position.75  Baseball wanted the commissioner to be a 
separate entity from the league with the authoritative ability to 
clean up the game.76  United States District Court Judge Kenesaw 
Mountain Landis fit the bill, and baseball named him its first 
commissioner in 1921.77 
Judge Landis accepted the position only after the league 
agreed to grant him broad powers to discipline players based upon 
the “best interests” of the game.78  Landis did not waste any time 
wielding his new-found powers.79  During his twenty-four year 
tenure, Landis banned thirteen players from the game for life,80 
including the eight players involved in the Black Sox scandal, even 
though a conciliatory grand jury cleared the players of any 
wrongdoing.81 
Landis even butted heads with Babe Ruth when Ruth violated 
the prohibition of “barnstorming.”82  Landis did not back down to 
baseball’s biggest superstar83 and suspended Ruth for the first six 
weeks of the 1922 season.84  Landis’ suspensions were all within his 
authority because the league’s agreement granted him the broad 
power to “impose punishment and pursue legal remedies for any 
playing of the game on the field.  Id. at 504–05. 
 75. Pachman, supra note 58, at 1413–14. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1414. 
 78. See Shayna M. Sigman, The Jurisprudence of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 
15 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 277, 303–04 (2005) (describing Landis’ negotiations with 
major league baseball for the commissioner’s position). 
 79. See infra notes 80–88 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Pachman, supra note 58, at 1415 (“[for] violations ranging from 
gambling to the suggestion by a pitcher that he would leave his club so that it 
would not win the pennant.”) (alteration in original). 
 81. Sigman, supra note 78, at 305. 
 82. See Pachman, supra note 58, at 1415–16 (“Barnstorming involves [players] 
playing exhibition games in small towns that do not have their own teams.  
Barnstorming was frowned upon by major league owners who feared that their 
best players might be hurt playing in such games.” (quoting P. DICKSON, DICKSON 
BASEBALL DICTIONARY 30–31 (1989))). 
 83. Babe Ruth’s hall of fame career included 714 homeruns, a lifetime 
batting average of .342, ninety-four wins as a pitcher, including seventeen shut-
outs, and a member of seven World Series championship teams.  These statistics 
are available at http://www.baberuth.com/flash/about/stats.html. 
 84. See Sigman, supra note 78, at 310–12 (detailing Landis’ battle with Babe 
Ruth). 
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conduct of league personnel that he determined to be detrimental 
to the best interests of the game.”85 
In 1931, Milwaukee American Association v. Landis86 provided the 
first and only legal test to Landis’ broad authority.87  The court held 
that Landis acted within his authority and specifically stated, “the 
commissioner is empowered to investigate upon his own initiative 
any act, transaction, or practice charged or alleged to be 
detrimental to the best interests of baseball.”88  This single legal test 
of Landis’ authority may have been indicative of the general 
attitude toward authority at that time.89 
2. Bowie Kuhn, 1969 – 1984 
Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Bowie Kuhn90 provided another 
opportunity for the legal system to define the scope of the 
commissioner’s authority, forty-five years after Landis.91  In 1976, 
Oakland Athletics’ flamboyant owner Charles O. Finley92 sparked a 
court battle when he sold three of his star players before the trade 
deadline.93  Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn rejected the 
transactions, causing Finley to immediately bring suit.  Once again, 
a commissioner acting in the “best interests” of the game reigned 
 85. Pachman, supra note 58, at 1415. 
 86. 49 F.2d 298 (N.D.Ill. 1931). 
 87. See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW, TEXT, CASES, 
PROBLEMS 14 (3d ed., Thomson West 2004) (1993) (explaining that American 
Association v. Landis arose out of Landis’ refusal to approve a St. Louis Browns’ 
transaction involving, “a player named Fred Bennett [who] had been transferred 
several times between the St. Louis Browns and several minor league teams, but all 
the clubs were secretly controlled by Browns’ owner Phil Ball.”). 
 88. Landis, 49 F.2d at 302. 
 89. “Former Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn has pointed out that, at the 
time Landis served as commissioner, people tended to accept quietly the acts of 
those in leadership positions, but that after World War II ended, baseball owners 
became increasingly willing to challenge commissioner authority.”  Pachman, 
supra note 58, at 1416. 
 90. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 91. Landis, 49 F.2d 298. 
 92. See C.W. Nevius, Flamboyant Ex-A’s Owner Finley Dies, His Teams Won Three 
Straight World Series, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 1996, at A1 (describing Finley’s 
flamboyancies, including being responsible for changing Oakland’s uniform 
colors to “kelly green, wedding gown white and California gold.”). 
 93. Finley, 569 F.2d at 531.  Finley sold stars Joe Rudi and Rollie Fingers to the 
Boston Red Sox for $2 million and Vida Blue to the New York Yankees for $1.5 
million.  Commissioner Kuhn disapproved of the assignments stating they were 
“inconsistent with the best interests of baseball, the integrity of the game and the 
maintenance of public confidence in it.”  Id. 
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supreme as the court held that “the Commissioner acted in good 
faith, after investigation, consultation and deliberation, in a 
manner which he determined to be in the best interests of 
baseball.”94 
3. Ted Turner & The Atlanta Braves 
Also in 1976, the Atlanta Braves and its owner Ted Turner 
found themselves testing the commissioner’s authority in the 
courtroom.  Commissioner Kuhn suspended Turner for one year 
for commenting on a potential free agent in violation of league 
rules.95  Furthermore, Kuhn took away the Braves’ first round draft 
choice in the upcoming amateur draft.96  The Atlanta Braves and 
Ted Turner immediately filed a complaint against the 
commissioner seeking to enjoin Kuhn from imposing the 
sanctions.97 
Once again, the court upheld a commissioner’s authority and 
held that, “the defendant Commissioner had ample authority to 
punish plaintiffs in this case, for acts considered not in the best 
interests of baseball.”98  The court, however, limited the scope of 
the commissioner’s authority and decided that taking away the 
Braves’ draft pick was excessive.99 
4. Pete Rose 
In 1989, Pete Rose, manager of the Cincinnati Reds, gambled 
on his own team to win and found himself subject to the 
 94. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 23 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 95. See id. at 25 (describing that in September of 1976, Kuhn discovered that 
the Atlanta Braves’ General Manager violated Major League Rule 3(g), which 
prohibited tampering when he made improper contact with potential free agent 
Gary Matthews.  Kuhn fined the Braves $5,000 and took away their first pick in the 
amateur draft.  Then in October 1976, Atlanta Braves’ owner Ted Turner told San 
Francisco Giants’ owner Bob Lurie that “the Braves would go as high as necessary 
to get Matthews” thus violating the tampering rule again). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (D. 
Ga. 1977). 
 98. Id. at 1220. 
 99. See id. at 1226 (“The deprivation of a draft choice was first and foremost a 
punitive sanction, and a sanction that is not specifically enumerated . . . 
[a]ccordingly, the court concludes that the Commissioner was without the 
authority to impose that sanction, and its imposition is therefore void.”) 
(alteration in original). 
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commissioner’s discipline.100  When Commissioner Giamatti caught 
wind of the rumors involving Rose’s gambling habits, he hired John 
Dowd, a Washington lawyer, to investigate the rumors.101  Once 
Rose learned of Giamatti’s investigation, he filed suit in state court 
to enjoin the commissioner’s actions.102  Jurisdictional disputes 
followed and Giamatti eventually removed the case to federal 
court.103  Ultimately, the case settled out of court and resulted in 
Rose’s ban from baseball.104  Although the case settled, “the judicial 
opinion in Rose v. Giamatti . . . laid bare the reality . . . that Major 
League Baseball is a unique organization . . . [with] extraordinary 
power invested in the Commissioner.”105 
B. History of the NFL Commissioner 
The Associated Press donned Jim Thorpe as the greatest 
athlete in the first half of the twentieth century.106  Thorpe’s 
stardom led the American Professional Football Association 
(renamed the NFL in 1922) to name him its first president in 
1920.107  Joe Carr became president after Thorpe’s lone year in the 
position, and he served as president until 1939.108  Carl Stock 
followed Carr as president until 1941 when the NFL formally 
changed the title of its “president’s” position to “commissioner”109 
and appointed Elmer Layden to that post.110  Layden served as the 
 100. See PETE ROSE & RICK HILL, MY PRISON WITHOUT BARS 147–48 (2004) 
(describing why he lied about gambling on his own team to win). 
 101. Id. at 149. 
 102. Id. at 166. 
 103. Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 908 (D. Ohio 1989). 
 104. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 9 (“Rose agreed on August 23, 
1989 to settle the case on the terms that Rose would withdraw his suit, accept the 
Commissioner’s jurisdiction and penalty, but neither admit nor deny having bet 
on baseball.”). 
 105. Id. (citing Rose v. Giamatti at 917) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 106. See Hal Bock, 100 Years That Transformed Sports, SEATTLE TIMES, May 30, 
1999, at D1 (“[Thorpe was named] the world's greatest athlete [by the Associated 
Press, because] . . . he won the pentathlon and decathlon in the 1912 Olympics, 
played professional baseball and football for 20 years and was commissioner of the 
football league that became the NFL.”). 
 107. MICHAEL MACCAMBRIDGE, AMERICA’S GAME: THE EPIC STORY OF HOW PRO 
FOOTBALL CAPTURED A NATION 7 (2004). 
 108. See id. at 7–9 (detailing Joe Carr’s years as NFL president). 
 109. See Pachman, supra note 58, at 1417 n.55 (noting that the NFL changed 
the title of “president” to “commissioner” in 1941). 
 110. MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 107, at 9. 
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NFL’s commissioner for five years, followed by Bert Bell who took 
over the office in 1946 until his death in 1959.111  No notable 
suspensions for off-the-field misconduct took place, however, until 
NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle investigated player gambling in 
1963. 
1. Pete Rozelle, 1960 – 1989 
In 1963, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle butted heads with 
the Green Bay Packers’ Hall of Fame running back Paul 
Hornung112 and Detroit Lions All-Pro Alex Karras.113  In 1962, 
rumors of gambling by NFL players prompted Rozelle to appoint 
NFL Treasurer Austin Gunsell to investigate the matter.114  As a 
result of the investigation, Rozelle suspended Hornung and Karras 
indefinitely for gambling on football games.115  Rozelle reinstated 
both players after one year, allowing Hornung to play a significant 
role on the Packers’ NFL championship team in 1965.116 
Even without today’s broad commissioner powers at his 
disposal, Rozelle received a great deal of praise for handling the 
league’s gambling crisis in the early 1960s.117  Sports Illustrated 
even named Rozelle “Sportsman of the Year” in 1963, “[f]or his 
actions in preserving the integrity of the NFL.”118 
Notably, Rozelle’s ability to land television contracts paved the 
way for the NFL’s future financial success.119  In 1962, Rozelle 
negotiated the first league-wide television contract with CBS worth 
$4.65 million, substantially increasing the league’s revenue-
 111. See id. at 40 (detailing the NFL owners’ selection of Bell as commissioner).  
See also id. at 124–26 (detailing Bell’s last days as commissioner before he died of a 
massive heart attack while watching the Philadelphia Eagles play the Pittsburgh 
Steelers at Franklin Field in Philadelphia). 
 112. See SPORTS AND THE LAW, MAJOR LEGAL CASES, supra note 72, at 85–86 
(noting that Hornung was an All-American twice, won the Heisman trophy in 
college, and was an All-Pro for the Green Bay Packers in 1960 and 1961). 
 113. See id. at 86 (noting that Karras was also an All-American twice in college 
and an All-Pro for the Detroit Lions in 1960 and 1962). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. (“[Hornung] reportedly placed bets ranging from $100 to $500 on 
football games dating back to 1958.  From 1959 to 1961, Karras made bets from 
$50 to $100 on NFL games.”). 
 116. Id. at 87. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 86. 
 119. See FORBES.com, supra note 5 (noting that the NFL is now the richest and 
most profitable sports league in the world due in part to its multi-billion dollar 
television contracts). 
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generating power.120  Rozelle’s financial accomplishments gave him 
more leverage at the bargaining table with owners and in 1988 
prompted the league to grant him as commissioner “‘full, 
complete, and final jurisdiction and authority [over] any dispute 
involving a member or members in the League.’”121  One year later 
Rozelle would step down as commissioner, allowing a trial lawyer to 
fill his shoes. 
2. Paul Tagliabue, 1989 – 2006 
Paul Tagliabue is one of many commissioners in sports to carry 
a legal background into office.122  Prior to holding the 
commissioner’s office, Tagliabue represented the NFL as outside 
counsel in various capacities.123  Specifically, Tagliabue defended 
the NFL in an antitrust case brought by the USFL in 1988.124  
Although the NFL technically lost the case, the USFL walked away 
with a mere $3.00 in damages.125  Tagliabue’s years of legal training 
could be one of the reasons why he created a policy regulating 
conduct in the NFL. 
Originally, the name “conduct policy” sprang from the NFL’s 
“violent crime policy” adopted in 1997.126  At the time, football 
players were being increasingly associated with crimes of domestic 
violence.127  This problematic behavior prompted Tagliabue to 
 120. MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 107, at 173. 
 121. Pollack, supra note 70, at 1677 (citing NFL CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 
8.3, at 17–18 (1988)). 
 122. Current NBA Commissioner David Stern and current NHL Commissioner 
Gary Bettman are both attorneys. See NBA.com, David J. Stern, 
http://www.nba.com/nba101/david_j_stern_bio.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2008); 
Cornell University—Alumni Profile, http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alumni/profiles/ 
alumni/Gary-Bettman.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (stating that Bettman 
received his undergraduate degree from Cornell and his law degree from New 
York University). 
 123. See MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 107, at 381 (noting that Tagliabue 
represented the NFL in over fifty cases prior to becoming commissioner). 
 124. U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (1988). 
 125. Id. at 1341. 
 126. See John Gibeaut, When Pros Turn Cons: Athletes Who Commit Crimes are 
Giving Sports a Black Eye.  But While the NFL Claims It’s Tackling the Problem, Other 
Leagues Appear Content to Sit on the Sidelines, 86 A.B.A.J. 38, 108 (July 2000) (“The 
violent crime policy came in 1997, amid criticism in some quarters that the NFL 
had become a league full of criminals.”). 
 127. See Anna L. Jefferson, The NFL and Domestic Violence: The Commissioner’s 
Power to Punish Domestic Abusers, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 353, 353 (1997) (“Fifty-six 
current and former football players and eighty-five college players were reported 
to the police for violent behavior toward women between January 1989 and 
18
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adopt the policy before the start of the 1997 season, making it the 
only one of its kind among major U.S. sports.128  The violent crime 
policy allowed the commissioner to suspend and/or fine a player 
charged with any crime of violence, and required the offender to 
undergo counseling and clinical evaluations.129 
Notably, Tagliabue fined Baltimore Ravens’ star linebacker Ray 
Lewis $250,000 after Lewis pled guilty to a misdemeanor crime of 
obstructing law enforcement in 2001.130  Tagliabue disciplined 
Lewis to protect the league’s image by stating that, “such admitted 
misconduct clearly contributes to the negative stereotyping of NFL 
players.”131  Although some viewed Lewis’ punishment as weak, at 
the time it was the largest fine ever in the NFL unaccompanied by a 
suspension.132 
C. NFL Present Day 
1. Roger Goodell, August 2006 – Present 
In August 2006, the thirty-two NFL owners unanimously 
elected Roger Goodell as the league’s new commissioner.133  
Goodell’s NFL service dates back to 1982, when he was an intern in 
the NFL’s offices in New York.134  After a short stint in the New York 
Jets public relations office in 1983, Goodell returned to the 
league’s office and continued to climb the NFL’s corporate 
November 1994.”). 
 128. See Randy Covitz, NFL Puts Offenders on Notice: Off-Field Transgressions Won’t 
Be Tolerated by League with New Policy in Effect, KAN. CITY STAR, July 2, 1998, at D1 
(noting that the NFL’s violent crime policy is the first among major sports to 
discipline off-the-field transgressions). 
 129. See Bukowski, supra note 6, at 110 (citing NFL VIOLENT CRIME POLICY, 1998 
ROOKIE SYMPOSIUM-TAB 7: LEAGUE POLICIES FOR PLAYERS (1998)). 
 130. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 99 (describing Lewis’ obstruction 
of law enforcement’s investigation involving two stabbing deaths outside an 
Atlanta nightclub shortly after the 2001 Super Bowl). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Brian Lewis, Rejuvenated Jumbo Will Only Miss One, N.Y. POST, Aug. 25, 
2000, at 100 (discussing that Ray Lewis received the largest ever non-suspension 
fine in the NFL history). 
 133. George Vecsey, Sports of the Times; Bridging the Old N.F.L. With the New, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, at D1. 
 134. See Judy Battista, Pro Football; Lifetime Spent Preparing for Top Job in the N.F.L., 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at 81 (describing Goodell’s career background in the 
NFL). 
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ladder.135  In 2000, Goodell became Commissioner Paul Tagliabue’s 
right hand man, assuming the positions of NFL Chief Operating 
Officer and Executive Vice President.136  Therefore, when Goodell 
took the reins of the commissioner’s office in 2006, he was no 
stranger to the inner workings of the NFL’s $6 billion a year 
industry.137  The protection of the NFL’s wealth and image quickly 
became one of Goodell’s top priorities, especially since player off-
the-field misconduct plagued his first year as commissioner.138 
2. Miscreants in the NFL 
During Goodell’s first years as commissioner, nine players on 
the Cincinnati Bengals were arrested during a nine month span, 
and ten players were arrested in a fourteen month span.139  Notably, 
Bengals’ linebacker Odell Thurman served a season-long 
suspension in 2006 based on an arrest for drunken driving and 
subsequently missing a scheduled drug test.140  Thurman applied 
for reinstatement after one year pursuant to the league’s policy.141  
Goodell, however, denied Thurman’s reinstatement for the 2007 
season.142  As a result, Thurman will miss two seasons of play and 
salary due to off-the-field misconduct. 
Cincinnati’s players were not the only ones getting in trouble 
with Goodell during his first year.143  On June 5, 2007, Goodell used 
the conduct policy again and suspended Chicago Bears’ defensive 
tackle Terry “Tank” Johnson for the first eight games of the 2007 
NFL season.144  Goodell suspended Johnson because in December 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See David Flores, Ex-Cowboy has Key Job with Team, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Aug. 9, 2007, at 1C (“Goodell has made addressing players’ bad off-field 
behavior one of his top priorities since succeeding Paul Tagliabue a year ago.”). 
 139. See Joe Kay, NFL Teams on Notice: Character Counts, CHARLESTON GAZETTE 
(W. Va.), Apr. 26, 2007, at 5B (discussing the Cincinnati Bengals’ problems with 
players’ off-the-field run-ins with law enforcement). 
 140. See Alex Marvez, Assessing the New NFL Commissioner’s Job Performance, S. FLA. 
SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 2006 (discussing Thurman’s drunken driving arrest and 
violations under the NFL’s drug policy). 
 141. See NFL Suspends Bengals CB Joseph for One Game, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., 
Oct. 10, 2007 (noting that Thurman sat out the 2006 season for violating the 
NFL’s substance abuse policy and that Goodell denied Thurman’s reinstatement 
the next year). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Flores, supra note 138. 
 144. Clifton Brown, The Bears’ Tank Johnson is Suspended for Eight Games, N.Y. 
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2006, he violated his probation when the Gurnee Police 
Department raided his home and found six unregistered firearms, 
including two assault rifles.145  As a result of the raid, Tank pled 
guilty to a misdemeanor weapons charge in May 2007146 and served 
jail time for the offense and for his probation violation.147 
In Tank’s situation, Goodell waited to suspend Tank until the 
legal system decided its course of action.  But according to the 
league’s policies, the commissioner can discipline a player without 
waiting for the legal system to determine a player’s fate.148  More 
importantly, the commissioner need only afford players due 
process during the commissioner’s investigation.149  The 
commissioner may not, however, immediately suspend a player 
without some sort of “investigation, consultation, and 
deliberation.”150 
IV. THIRD DOWN CONVERSION – ROGER GOODELL’S RULINGS ARE 
LEGAL, JUST, AND THE BEST FOR THE BUSINESS 
A. Legal 
Principles in labor law and private association law protect 
Goodell’s decisions to discipline players and coaches for off-the-
field misconduct.  Labor law allows sports leagues to collectively 
bargain with employee unions to reach agreements that govern 
terms of employment.151  As a result, players are able to negotiate 
with teams for multi-million dollar contracts in exchange for 
following league’s rules, such as off-the-field conduct. 
1. Labor Law 
Historically, employees in large numbers had difficulty 
TIMES, June 5, 2007, at D6. 
 145. NBC 5 Sports, Tank Johnson Charged After Police Raid Home, Dec. 14, 2006, 
available at http://www.nbc5.com/sports/10535933/detail.html (noting that 
children were also in Johnson’s home and some of the guns were loaded during 
the raid). 
 146. Brown, supra note 144. 
 147. Id. 
 148. NFL Conduct Policy, supra note 25. 
 149. Pachman, supra note 58, at 1430–32. 
 150. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 23. 
 151. See 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 11:10 (Gary A. 
Uberstine ed., 2003) (explaining collective bargaining in sports). 
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negotiating for better working conditions with management.152  
The emergence of labor law helped protect workers’ rights by 
governing the relationship between employers and employees.153  
Athletes in major sports, however, did not start to receive better 
wages and conditions until the emergence of unions.154  Under the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), unions received the 
exclusive right to negotiate working conditions on behalf of 
employees.155 
Importantly, the NLRA grants employers and the employee’s 
exclusive bargaining agent the right to enter into CBAs.156  Once an 
agreement is finalized, it supremely governs the terms and 
conditions of employment.157  Moreover, once the parties reach an 
agreement, labor law “precludes . . . employer[s] from changing 
those terms and conditions without engaging in collective 
bargaining . . . .”158  Without these agreements, employers would be 
able to impose mandatory terms and conditions of employment 
unilaterally.159  As a result, these agreements check and balance 
sports commissioners by not allowing them to change certain rules 
and regulations without player input.160  Additionally, in most 
circumstances private association law allows voluntary associations 
 152. See JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS: THE MAFIA AND 
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 5 (2006) (explaining that in the United States, labor 
unions have been fighting for better wages and working conditions since the 
eighteenth century). 
 153. See HAROLD W. DAVEY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 2–3 
(4th ed. 1982) (explaining the collective bargaining process). 
 154. See generally id. at 28–30 (describing the emergence of unions). 
 155. See id. at 31–32 (explaining that the NLRA, formerly known as the Wagner 
Act, grants labor unions the power to represent employees exclusively at the 
bargaining table). 
 156. Id. 
 157. 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:10. 
 158. Id. (citations omitted). 
 159. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 227 (noting that under the NLRA, 
the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are wages, hours, and working 
conditions) (citing Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea 
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965)). 
 160. 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:10 
(“[A]n arbitrator ruled that Rozelle could not unilaterally impose a new drug 
program, which included the unscheduled drug testing of players, because that 
too constituted a unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employment 
that could only be effectuated through collective bargaining.” (citing Nat’l 
Football League Players Ass’n & Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council & the Nat’l 
Football League (Kasher, Arb.) (Oct. 25, 1986))). 
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to handle their own disputes without the legal system’s 
interference.161 
2. Private Association Law 
While labor law governs interactions between employers and 
employees, private association law grants people the right to create 
associations, or the employers themselves.162  Once created, 
associations have the right to form their own rules and 
regulations.163  Courts will typically not interfere with a private 
association’s rules and regulations, including disciplinary actions, 
as long as the association follows basic requirements of due process 
and administrative standards.164 
Sports leagues enjoy the protections of private association law 
when they create policies, such as a conduct provision, governing 
employees.165  However, the various court battles testing the scope 
of the commissioners’ powers provide that private association law is 
not blanket immunity from the legal system.166  Therefore, leagues 
attempt to avoid court battles and implement their own governing 
documents defining responsibilities of the league, clubs, and 
players. 
3. Governing NFL Documents 
a. League Constitution & Bylaws 
A sports league’s constitution contains its fundamental laws 
and principles.167  This foundational document delegates certain 
powers to the league and commissioner.168  Sports leagues balance 
the powers granted in the constitution with other governing league 
 161. See 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:11. 
 162. See generally 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 1 (1999) (describing the 
general powers of associations). 
 163. See id. at § 6 (explaining associations’ rights to create bylaws, rules and 
regulations). 
 164. Pachman, supra note 58, at 1430-32. 
 165. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 6 (1999). 
 166. See supra Part III.A.1–4. (detailing legal battles testing commissioners’ 
disciplinary authority); see also 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra 
note 151, § 11:11 (explaining court cases testing disciplinary powers of 
commissioners). 
 167. 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:6. 
 168. Id. 
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documents.169  The CBA is the most important league document 
governing conditions of employment for the players.170 
b. Collective Bargaining Agreement 
During times of labor peace, a CBA governs the terms and 
conditions of employment for players, league officials, and league 
employees.171  Strikes and lockouts mainly ensue because of the 
parties’172 inability to reach agreement on a new CBA or renew the 
previous one.173  Most CBAs in sports cover the same basic themes, 
such as drafting of non-league players; standard player contracts; 
free agency; minimum salaries; pensions; injury protections; drug 
policies; control of agents; and discipline.174  After the parties reach 
an agreement on the issues, they attempt to decide its term of 
years.  The parties come back to the bargaining table roughly two 
to three years before the CBA expires to give them enough time to 
reach agreement.175 
In 1958, NFL commissioner Bert Bell officially recognized the 
NFLPA as a union.176  Ten years passed, however, until the League 
and the players finalized a collective bargaining agreement.177  
Initially, the pages of the NFL’s CBA were basic and only covered 
issues such as, “minimum salaries, pensions, injury and other 
 169. Id. § 11:8. 
 170. See generally NFL-CBA, supra note 11. 
 171. See 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:4 
(“When all goes well, there is the collective bargaining agreement, entered into 
between the union and the league . . . .”). 
 172. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004), rev’d, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Representatives of each of the thirty-two 
teams . . . comprise the National Football League Management Council 
(“NFLMC”), the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the League.  The 
1,400-odd NFL players are exclusively represented by the National Football League 
Players Association . . . .”). 
 173. See 1 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 4:9 (Gary A. Uberstine 
ed., 2003) (noting that labor strife plagued the NFL in the 1970s and 1980s, with 
players’ strikes in 1974, 1982, and 1987).  These strikes were mainly due to the 
League and players’ inability to reach agreement on caps on players’ salaries and 
restrictions on free agency.  Id.  Overall, the players did not achieve the success 
desired by striking.  See also id. (“It is impossible to characterize the players as 
winners, and one is tempted to declare the owners outright victors.”). 
 174. Id. § 4:12-20. 
 175. See, e.g., Elfin, supra note 23, at C1 (explaining that Roger Goodell will 
take part in CBA extension discussions three years before the agreement expires). 
 176. 1 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 173, § 4:2. 
 177. Id. 
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insurance protection, and other conventional wage and conditions 
of employment issues.”178 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the CBAs attempted to broaden 
players’ issues such as the draft, free agency through negotiation, 
and arbitration.179  Importantly, the terms of these agreements are 
only valid for durations determined by the parties.180  While owners 
and players were arguing over salaries and free agency well into the 
early 1990s, lesser known regulations regarding discipline were 
agreed to in the 1993 CBA.181 
The CBA is one of the various documents allowing the 
commissioner to discipline players to protect the “league’s 
image.”182  In 1993, the NFL’s CBA provided the foundation for the 
league’s broad disciplinary authority today.183  In 1993, the NFLPA 
and the NFL reached agreement on two significant articles of 
discipline: one governing individual club discipline and one 
governing commissioner discipline.184 
Currently, the NFL’s disciplinary sections detail the league’s 
and clubs’ available authority to control their players’ misconduct 
through suspensions and/or fines.185  The agreement details 
discipline for two types of behavior: conduct on the playing field, 
and “conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence 
in, the game of professional football.”186  Furthermore, when 
players sign their contracts, they agree to the commissioner’s 
authority to discipline for conduct detrimental to the league.187 
c. Uniform Player Contract 
The standard NFL player contract is a basic framework of 
minimum rights and conditions, which gives players and clubs a 
foundation to build upon and create contracts.188  Sometimes 
 178. Id. § 4:3. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. § 4:10. 
 181. See 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:24. 
 182. See NFL-CBA, supra note 11, at art. XI (allowing the commissioner to 
discipline “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the 
game of professional football . . . .”). 
 183. 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:24. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 168–69 & n.4. 
 186. NFL-CBA, supra note 11, art. XI, § 1, para. (a), at 20. 
 187. NFL-CBA, supra note 11, app. C, para. 15, at 166. 
 188. See 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:5. 
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player contracts include unusual clauses such as Oakland A’s owner 
Charlie Finley offering players $300 if they grow a mustache,189 
Manny Ramirez’s no-trade clause taking effect only after another 
Red Sox player received one,190 and the Roger Clemens “family 
clause.”191  These supplementary contract clauses may not conflict 
with the minimum rights set forth in the CBA.192 
Significantly, each NFL contract contains an “Integrity of the 
Game” clause.193  Under this clause, the commissioner has the 
power to fine, suspend, or terminate a player’s contract for, 
“conduct reasonably judged . . . to be detrimental to the League or 
professional football.”194  This clause also requires the player to 
recognize “the detriment to the League and professional football 
that would result from impairment of public confidence in the 
honest and orderly conduct of NFL games or integrity and good 
character of NFL players.”195  Therefore, when a player signs a NFL 
contract, he is agreeing to the commissioner’s discretionary power 
to discipline for conduct.196 
4. Picking Up the Blitz – Is the NFL Too Strict? 
a. Major Leage Baseball (MLB) Compared 
Baseball does not have a per se “conduct policy.”  But, the 
commissioner of baseball does have the authority to discipline 
“conduct by Major League Clubs, owners, officers, employees or 
players that is deemed by the Commissioner to not be in the ‘best 
interests’ of Baseball.”197  Players and the Major League Baseball 
 189. Ron Kroichick, The Quirks of Perks: Player Contracts Can Run Gamut, S.F. 
CHRON., Apr. 29, 2003, at C1 (describing unusual player contract clauses). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Ron Chimelis, All in the Family Clause, THE REPUBLICAN (Springfield, 
Mass.), May 21, 2007, at C1 (discussing the family clause that allows Roger 
Clemens to leave the team in between starts to visit his family). 
 192. 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, supra note 151, § 11:5. 
 193. NFL-CBA, supra note 11, app. C, para. 15, at 166. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Goodell Letter, supra note 63, at 3 (noting that Vick violated the terms 
of his player contract and that the commissioner is disciplining Vick pursuant to 
the commissioner’s power granted under the CBA). 
 197. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL CLUBS, MAJOR LEAGUE CONSTITUTION, Art. II § 3 
(2005), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLConsititutionJune2005 
Update.pdf. See also Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 180–81 (noting that baseball initially 
intended the “best interests” catch-all provision to handle gambling problems in 
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Players Association (MLBPA) also receive advance notice of any 
league investigations into player conduct.198 
Furthermore, baseball mandates a “just cause” standard of 
review for disciplinary actions.199  The league “makes whole” those 
players who are found to be improperly disciplined under their 
grievance procedures.200  Even with all these disciplinary tools in 
place, baseball still finds it unnecessary to implement a conduct 
policy.  Perhaps it should, considering the sport’s problem with 
players and coaches driving under the influence of alcohol.201 
On March 22, 2007, St. Louis Cardinals manager Tony La 
Russa was arrested on a drunken driving charge after police found 
him asleep at the wheel of his car while it was partially stopped in 
an intersection.202  A little over a month later, one of La Russa’s 
players, Josh Hancock, died when his sport utility vehicle crashed 
into the back of a tow truck.203  Hancock’s blood alcohol content 
was twice the legal limit at the time of the crash.204 
Regardless, neither baseball nor its teams suspend or fine 
players or coaches for drunken driving arrests.205  Rather, baseball is 
trying to catch-up to the NFL’s drug testing standards and falling 
behind in regulating conduct.  A weak stance on conduct is not a 
problem solely isolated to baseball. 
the sport and not other types of conduct). 
 198. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, 2007-11 BASIC AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE CLUBS AND THE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS 
ASSOCIATION, art. XII, § E, at 45 (2006), http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_ 
english.pdf [hereinafter MLB-CBA]. 
 199. See id. art. XII, § A, at 42–43 (“[I]n Grievances regarding discipline, the 
issue to be resolved shall be whether there has been just cause for the penalty 
imposed.”). 
 200. See id. (defining “make whole” to include repaying any fines, paying lost 
salary including interest, and adjusting player statistics for incentive based contract 
clauses only). 
 201. See Bill Plaschke, Baseball is Ripe for a 12-Step Program, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 
2007, at 1 (discussing baseball’s refusal to acknowledge its drinking problem and 
take actions to curb it). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Chuck Finder, Baseball Should Dry Up, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 20, 
2007, at C2 (noting that it was also found that Hancock was talking on his cell 
phone at the time of the crash and the police found marijuana in his car). 
 205. Plaschke, supra note 201, at 1 (“Baseball struts around the national stage 
fighting steroids, then slips into the shadowy wings to embrace alcohol.”). 
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b. National Basketball Association (NBA) Compared 
The NBA has seen its fair share of problems on and off the 
court, including Latrell Sprewell choking his coach in 1997,206 Ron 
Artest jumping in the stands to fight rowdy Detroit Pistons fans in 
2004,207 and Stephen Jackson firing gun shots outside a strip club in 
2006.208  In response to Sprewell’s choking incident, the NBA 
implemented a rule that if a player attacks his coach, then the 
league will terminate the player’s contract.209 
The NBA has its own CBA provision handling player 
conduct.210  Additionally, the NBA’s constitution and uniform 
player contract grants the commissioner power to suspend and/or 
fine any player who makes statements detrimental to the “best 
interests” of the league or is “guilty of conduct that does not 
conform to standards of morality and fair play.”211 
 206. See Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 106 (describing the incident at a Golden 
State Warriors’ practice in 1997, in which Latrell Sprewell choked his head coach, 
P.J. Carlesimo). 
 207. See Liz Robbins, N.B.A. Bars 4 After Brawl Involving Fans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
21, 2004, at 11 (describing the brawl between players and fans during a game 
between the Indiana Pacers and Detroit Pistons in Auburn Hills, Michigan, in 
which Ron Artest jumped into the stands to fight fans after a fan threw a cup of 
liquid on Artest). 
 208. See Union Considers Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007 at D6 (describing 
Jackson’s guilty plea to a felony count of criminal recklessness for firing shots 
outside a strip club). 
 209. See Mike Wise, PRO BASKETBALL: NOTEBOOK; Barkley Has Influence on 
Next Generation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, at D8 (discussing the NBA’s rule on 
player’s attacking their coaches). 
 210. See NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, 
art. VI (1999), available at http://www.nbpa.com/downloads/CBA.pdf 
[hereinafter NBA-CBA] (including sections pertaining to unlawful violence, 
counseling for violent misconduct, firearms, league investigations, and mandatory 
programs). 
 211. See NBA Player’s Association, CBA Exhibit: Excerpt from NBA 
Constitution (Misconduct), Excerpt from NBA By-laws (Waivers), and Agent 
Certification, http://www.nbpa.com/cba_exhibits/exhibitA-excerpt.php (last 
visited Feb. 09, 2008).  Article 35(d) states: 
. . . (i) shall have made or caused to be made any statement having, or 
that was designed to have, an effect prejudicial or detrimental to the best 
interests of basketball or of the Association or of a Member, or (ii) shall 
have been guilty of conduct that does not conform to standards of 
morality or fair play, that does not comply at all times with all federal, 
state, and local laws, or that is prejudicial or detrimental to the 
Association. 
Id. 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss3/4
3. AMBROSE - ADC 4/23/2008  1:20:23 PM 
2008] THE NFL MAKES IT RAIN 1097 
 
Similar to baseball’s CBA, the NBA’s agreement includes a 
provision that provides a “just cause” standard of review for 
grievances challenging discipline.212  Finally, NBA players have the 
right to appeal grievances to a grievance panel and even to an 
impartial arbitrator if the grievance panel does not resolve the 
matter.213 
Double jeopardy presents another interesting issue in the 
grievance process.  For example, the NBA attempted to suspend 
Latrell Sprewell for an entire season for choking his head coach 
during a practice in 1997.214  Prior to the league suspending 
Sprewell, his team suspended him for ten games.215  The neutral 
arbitrator used a “just cause” standard of review and determined 
that the two suspensions constituted double jeopardy.216  
Accordingly, the neutral arbitrator overturned the NBA’s 
suspension and reinstated Sprewell’s contract.217  In an attempt to 
avoid these circumstances in the future, the NBA implemented a 
provision similar to the NFL’s provision, that a league’s action 
supersedes any club action.218 
c. National Hockey League (NHL) 
The NHL’s policies regulating misconduct are similar to those 
found in other sports leagues, including, Article 18 of the NHL’s 
CBA detailing the commissioner’s authority to discipline for actions 
occurring on and off the ice.219  The NHL’s standard player 
 212. Compare NBA-CBA, supra note 211, art. XXXI, § 14(c) (“[T]he issue to be 
resolved shall be whether there has been just cause for the penalty imposed.”) with 
MLB-CBA, supra note 198, art. XII, § A, at 43 (“[I]n Grievances regarding 
discipline, the issue to be resolved shall be whether there has been just cause for 
the penalty imposed.”). 
 213. Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 185. 
 214. Bukowski, supra note 6, at 115; Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 106; Pollack, 
supra note 70, at 1698. 
 215. Bukowski, supra note 6, at 115; Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 106; Pollack, 
supra note 70, at 1698. 
 216. See Bukowski, supra note 6, at 115 (explaining the double jeopardy 
dilemma under commissioner and club disciplinary action). 
 217. See Liz Robbins, Union and Pacers Set to Fight Suspensions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
23, 2004, at D1 (noting that the arbitrator reduced Sprewell’s suspension to sixty-
eight games, but did not allow the club to terminate Sprewell’s contract). 
 218. Compare NFL-CBA, supra note 11, art. XI, § 5, at 20 (noting that league 
action precludes or supersedes club action for the same act or conduct) with NBA-
CBA, supra note 211, art. VI, § 6 (noting that league action precludes or 
supersedes club action for the same act or conduct). 
 219. NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASS’N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
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contract also requires players to acknowledge that they will refrain 
from “conduct detrimental to the best interest of the Club, the 
League or professional hockey generally.”220 
Furthermore, the NHL and BASEBALL have similar provisions 
regulating league investigations into player conduct which require 
notification of any investigation that may result in disciplinary 
action to the player and the players’ union.221  The NHL also grants 
the right to hold a hearing before any discipline takes place and 
allows a player to introduce evidence in his defense.222 
It is rare to hear about NHL players’ misconduct off the ice.  
Unlike baseball, however, the NHL recently took a stand against 
drunken driving.  In September 2006, former San Jose Sharks’ 
forward Mark Bell was arrested on suspicion of drunken driving 
and felony hit and run charges.223  The NHL responded by placing 
Bell in its substance abuse program, suspending him indefinitely, 
and recently tacking on a fifteen game suspension at the beginning 
of the 2007 season.224  The NHL’s players’ union said they are going 
to fight the suspension, something the NFLPA rarely does when the 
commissioner disciplines under the conduct policy.225 
d. NFLPA Compared 
In the 1960s, three of the four major sports recognized players 
unions,226 followed by the National Football League Players 
BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ 
ASSOCIATION, art. 18, at 95 (2005), http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf 
[hereinafter NHL-CBA]. 
 220. Id. Exhibit 1, para. 2, at 245. 
 221. Id. art. 18, § 18.4(a), at 96. 
 222. Id. art. 18, § 18.4(d), at 97 (“[T]he Commissioner or his designee will not 
impose discipline without holding a hearing. . . . The NHLPA and the Player have 
the right to present testimony, evidence and argument in the Player’s defense.”). 
 223. See Damien Cox, Leaf’s Bell Will Sit 15 Games; Perhaps Drunk Driving 
Suspension a Sign of New Priorities for NHL, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Canada), Sept. 13, 
2007, at SP06 (describing the NHL’s response to Bell’s and other NHL players’ 
incidents with drunken driving). 
 224. Id. 
 225. See N.H.L. Suspends Bell 15 Games, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007, at D5 (stating 
that the NHL’s players’ union will fight Bell’s suspension). 
 226. See Brent D. Showalter, Comment, Steroid Testing Policies in Professional 
Sports: Regulated by Congress or the Responsibility of the Leagues?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 
651, 654 (2007) (“The first union of players in professional sports was the National 
Basketball Players Association, which formed in 1964 . . . the Major League 
Baseball Players Association in 1965. Two years later, the National Hockey League 
Players Association was formed . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
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Association in 1970.227  Importantly, the early union leaders laid the 
ground work for players’ rights seen today.  Each leader came from 
a different background and carried with him a different set of 
fundamental principles. 
Marvin Miller, for example, was a highly respected labor 
economist who directed the MLBPA from 1966–1992.228  Due to his 
background of fighting for laborers’ rights, Miller focused his 
efforts on players’ individual rights and, therefore, increased 
minimum salaries and established free agency in baseball.229  The 
average salary for a baseball player in 1967 was $19,000 and 
increased to $2.57 million in 2003,230 which is roughly twice the 
$1.25 million average salary NFL players received in 2003.231 
In the NFL, Ed Garvey headed the NFLPA from 1971 to 
1983.232  Garvey, a sharp-edged lawyer from Wisconsin, fought 
primarily for players’ equal rights, including free agency.233  Player 
equality reflects the NFL’s current cap on players’ salaries and 
mandatory drug testing for performance enhancing substances.234  
By contrast, the MLBPA’s individual rights focus does not cap its 
players’ salaries and only recently implemented performance-
enhancing drug testing.235 
Players’ unions also fight on behalf of the players whenever a 
club or league suspends, fines, or otherwise reprimands a player.236  
The NFLPA supported Adam “Pacman” Jones’ appeal of his season-
long suspension in May 2007, which Goodell rejected.237  Jones 
 227. Id. 
 228. Major League Baseball Players Association: Miller Biography, 
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/bios/miller.jsp (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). 
 229. Id. 
 230. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 87, at 349. 
 231. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
rev’d in part, vacated in part, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 232. NFLPA History, available at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template. 
aspx?fmid=182&lmid=239&pid=0&type=l. 
 233. Id.  See also MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 107, at 316–17 (describing the 
NLPA’s fight against the Rozelle Rule in the early 1970s). 
 234. See Showalter, supra note 226, at 657 (noting that the NFL began drug 
testing players in 1987). 
 235. See id. at 658 (noting that baseball did not begin drug testing players for 
steroids until 2002). 
 236. See Lonnie Wheeler, Nothing Illegal in Cut for Conduct, CINCINNATI POST, 
May 24, 2007, at C1 (noting that the NFLPA is the organization that will protect 
players from termination). 
 237. See Authorities Haven’t Carried Out Vick Search Warrant, ST. PAUL PIONEER 
PRESS (Minn.), May 30, 2007, at D3 (explaining the NFLPA’s support of Jones’ 
appeal). 
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sought leniency once again when the NFLPA appealed his 
suspension on December 14, 2007, one month after Goodell 
denied Jones’ request for leniency.238  Goodell rejected the 
NFLPA’s argument that Jones’ punishment was too excessive and 
planned to review Jones’ status at the conclusion of the season.239 
The lack of NFLPA’s effective assistance, however, does not 
mean that it does not care about players’ rights.  Rather, it means 
the NFLPA is on board with the league’s conduct policy and the 
commissioner’s enforcement of it.240  With the NFLPA on board, it 
is easier for the commissioner to persuade players that disciplining 
off-the-field misconduct is the right thing to do.241 
B. Roger Goodell’s Rulings are Just 
“[P]ower at its best is love implementing the demands of 
justice, and justice at its best is love correcting everything 
that stands against love.”242 
Roger Goodell has dedicated his entire professional career to 
the NFL; he wants to see the league succeed more than anyone.243  
By strictly enforcing the NFL’s conduct policy, Goodell is 
recognizing the problems of the past and is setting precedent for 
the future, because past discipline for player misconduct was non-
existent, or at best, far too lenient.244  Even though Goodell is 
stricter on players than his predecessors, he has yet to ban a player 
for life, thus giving them another chance.245  Although Goodell has 
yet to do so, he promises to reinstate those players that conduct 
themselves properly during their suspensions.246 
 238. See Pac-Man’s Appeal Rejected, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 21, 2007, at 
D3 (noting the NFLPA’s request for leniency on Jones’ suspension). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Murray, supra note 23, at E1. 
 241. Elfin, supra note 23, at C1. 
 242. Martin Luther King Jr., 11th Convention of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference: Where Do We Go from Here? (Aug. 16, 1967), available at 
http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/pwork/0412/041216.htm. 
 243. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 244. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 245. See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
 246. See Mark Maske, NFL Suspends Players, Stiffens Conduct Policy, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 11, 2007 (“I must emphasize to you that this is your last opportunity to salvage 
your NFL career . . . I urge you to take full advantage of the resources available to 
support you in that effort.”) (quoting Roger Goodell’s letter to Adam “Pacman” 
Jones and Chris Henry). 
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1. Past Discipline was Too Lenient 
Lenient may be too kind an adjective for the NFL’s past 
discipline; non-existent might fit better.  Jeff Benedict and Don 
Yaeger studied 509 NFL players for the 1996–97 season and found 
that 109 of those players were formally charged with a serious 
crime.247  Of the 109 charged, the league did not ban one from the 
game.248  The list of criminal conduct by players is nearly endless, 
and the NFL and other sports leagues were previously reluctant to 
take disciplinary action.249 
Currently, the NFL is attempting to direct a ship lost at sea by 
taking a stand against off-the-field player misconduct.  The NFL is 
standing up to some of its most popular players involved in 
misconduct, regardless of the revenue some players generate for 
the league, based on basic moral principles.250  Furthermore, the 
league believes its stance on player misconduct will actually 
accelerate revenues by showing its fan base that the NFL will not 
tolerate certain behavior.251  Additionally, the commissioner is 
teaching current and prospective players, along with NFL fans, 
something about second chances because he gives players the 
opportunity to rehabilitate their character. 
2. Roger Goodell Gives Players Another Chance 
Showing that he is no cold-blooded dictator handing down 
draconian punishments, Roger Goodell gives misbehaving players 
another chance to get back into the league.252  Goodell laid out 
conditions for Adam “Pacman” Jones’ and Chris Henry’s 
reinstatement in suspension letters to both players.253  These 
conditions included such things as complying with any required 
 247. BENEDICT & YAEGER, supra note 3, at 5. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Elliot, supra note 7, at C1. 
 250. See Dave Hackenberg, Banishment, MERRIVILLE POST-TRIB. (Ind.), Aug. 22, 
2007, at B2 (noting that the NFL is punishing players, such as Michael Vick, for 
legal and moral misconduct). 
 251. Cf. Rick Morrissey, Goodell’s Guts Will Result in League’s Glory: NFL 
Commissioner’s Crackdown Aims to Win Back Fed-Up Fans, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 2007, at 1 
(discussing the idea that the NFL is a league that depends on its fans embracing 
the players, and recent player off-the-field misconduct is eroding fans’ sentiments 
towards players). 
 252. Maske, supra note 246. 
 253. ESPN.com, Goodell Suspends Pacman, Henry for Multiple Arrests, May 17, 
2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2832015. 
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counseling, education and treatment, and no more run-ins with law 
enforcement.254  Although using a broad term such as “run-ins” is 
vague and all-encompassing, the term still provides players with 
expectations regarding future conduct.  If players want to play in 
the NFL, they must abide by the rules.  Terry “Tank” Johnson took 
this to heart: after Goodell suspended Johnson, Johnson told 
Goodell that he hoped to become NFL’s next “Man of the Year.”255 
The jury is out, however, on whether the commissioner will 
give Michael Vick another chance to get back into the league.  He 
will likely wait for Vick to finish his twenty-three month prison 
sentence, handed down on December 10, 2007, for his involvement 
in illegal dogfighting.256  The commissioner thus benefited from 
Vick’s guilty plea because he did not have to determine Vick’s fate 
in the NFL while a legal ruling on his guilt hung in the balance. 
3. Down-Field Blocking – Due Process and the Separation of League 
and State 
Why is a commissioner able to discipline a player for actions 
pending legal adjudication?  Where are players’ rights to due 
process and an opportunity to be heard?  First, it should be noted 
that the NFL satisfies administrative requirements by providing 
notice and a hearing to disciplined players.257  Second, one needs to 
simply distinguish between a league’s rules and state laws.  Legal 
proceedings do not control the NFL’s disciplinary power.258  As 
Goodell stated in connection with the league’s tougher personal 
conduct policy, “[w]e must protect the integrity of the NFL.  The 
highest standards of conduct must be met by everyone in the NFL 
because it is a privilege to represent the NFL, not a right.”259 
Regardless of a legal proceeding, the CBA, league constitution, 
standard player contract, and conduct policy all bind a player to 
 254. Id. 
 255. See Calvin Watkins, NFL to Review Tank Johnson’s Case Next Week: Cowboys DT 
Hopes to Have Suspension Reduced to Six Games, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 2007 
(discussing Goodell’s conversation with Johnson). 
 256. Bill Rankin & D. Orlando Ledbetter, Vick’s Lies Boosted Prison Time, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST. Dec. 11, 2007, at A1. 
 257. See supra Part II.B.3.b (noting that Goodell granted Vick due process by 
providing a meaningful notice and hearing). 
 258. See infra Part IV.B.3.a.2 (discussing Goodell’s statements regarding legal 
proceedings controlling the league’s discipline). 
 259. See Steve Serby, A ‘Pac’ of Lies – NFL Must Ban Titan for Life, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, June 19, 2007, at 72 (quoting Roger Goodell). 
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the commissioner’s imposed discipline.260  When a player enters the 
league and signs a contract, the player agrees to defer to the league 
and clubs’ disciplinary powers.261  Moreover, as Roger Goodell 
explicitly stated when he suspended Michael Vick, the league does 
not have to wait for the legal system to adjudicate a player to 
suspend him.262 
a. Why Wait for a Legal Ruling? 
In 2003 and 2004, Kobe Bryant was on trial for sexual assault.263  
The league, however, did not suspend him during this time.264  The 
league’s inaction allowed Bryant to fly back and forth from the 
Colorado legal proceedings to practices and games in Los Angeles 
and other NBA cities.265 
The NBA’s policy language is not dramatically different than 
the NFL’s.  Each league may suspend a player for actions 
“detrimental to the league.”266  But, the key difference is how each 
league enforces its policies.  Ultimately, the judge in Bryant’s case 
dismissed the charges, and the NBA never disciplined Bryant for 
the incident.267  Therefore, why not afford a player an opportunity 
to prove his innocence? 
The NFL answers this question by inserting its own definitions 
of right or wrong and not binding itself to legal determinations.268  
If a player settles a case out of court because they pay their accuser 
off, is the player’s underlying conduct not “detrimental” to the 
league?  Also, if a jury can find a player guilty on a lesser standard 
 260. See supra Part IV.A.3.a–c. 
 261. See NFL-CBA, supra note 11 (stating that players agree to the 
commissioner’s authority to discipline for conduct detrimental to league). 
 262. See Goodell Letter, supra note 63. 
 263. See Kirk Johnson, As Accuser Balks, Prosecutors Drop Bryant Rape Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, at A1 (discussing the sexual assault case against Kobe Bryant). 
 264. See Jack McCallum & L. Jon Wertheim, The Great Unknown: Ten Seasons into 
a Certain Hall of Fame Career, Kobe Bryant Remains, to Teammates and Opponents, 
Admirers and Haters, as Big a Mystery as Ever, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 17, 2006, at 
46 (noting that NBA commissioner David Stern did not suspend Kobe Bryant for 
being charged with sexual assault). 
 265. See Regional Scene, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 27, 2004, at 17C 
(noting that Kobe traveled between Colorado for court hearings and made it back 
in time to play games in Los Angeles). 
 266. See supra Parts IV.A.3, IV.A.4.a.2. 
 267. McCallum & Wertheim, supra note 264, at 46. 
 268. See Goodell Letter, supra note 63 (“Quite apart from whatever sentence is 
ultimately imposed upon you by the federal court in Virginia, your conduct plainly 
merits a significant sanction by the NFL.”). 
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than beyond a reasonable doubt, does this mean the player did not 
violate any league policies?  The NFL is not going to defer its 
rulings to the legal system and get involved in these unpredictable 
situations.  Rather, Goodell is making his own determination on 
conduct, and at the same time abiding by league policies.  
Goodell’s enforcement was strikingly similar to Judge Kenesaw 
Mountain Landis’ rulings on player gambling in the early 1920s.269 
b. Landis & Goodell: The Similarities 
Landis and Goodell both took office charged with the task of 
cleaning up player misconduct in their respective sports.270  
Significantly, Landis used “best interests” determinations to punish 
player misconduct regardless of legal system determinations.271  
This is exactly how Goodell is currently enforcing the conduct 
policy in the NFL. 
Even as a former judge, Landis disregarded the fact that the 
court found all eight players innocent in the Black Sox scandal.  As 
Landis stated: 
Regardless of the verdict of the juries, no player that 
throws a game, no player that entertains proposals or 
promises to throw a game, no player that sits in a 
conference with a bunch of crooked gamblers, where the 
ways and means of throwing games are discussed, and 
does not promptly tell his club about it, will ever play 
professional baseball.272 
These comments by Landis were comparable to Roger 
Goodell’s statements to Michael Vick regarding his pending 
charges on dogfighting.  Goodell stated, “While it is for the 
criminal justice system to determine your guilt or innocence, it is 
my responsibility as commissioner of the National Football League 
to determine whether your conduct, even if not criminal, 
nonetheless violated league policies, including the personal 
conduct policy.”273 
 269. See infra IV.B.3.a.2. 
 270. See supra Parts III.A.1, III.C.1. 
 271. Sigman, supra note 78, at 304. 
 272. Quirk, supra note 72, at 118. 
 273. Larry Weisman, Vick Told to Stay out of Camp, USA TODAY, July 24, 2007, at 
1C. 
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While Landis received praise for the way he handled baseball’s 
gambling problems,274 it is too early to determine the long-term 
effects of Goodell’s suspensions, as more suspensions are likely to 
come in the future.  Thus far, most critics applaud Goodell as 
someone who is enforcing the conduct policy and finally standing 
up against player misconduct off the field.275  Nevertheless, it is not 
unprecedented for a suspended player to receive an acquittal in the 
legal system, thus forcing the league to acknowledge they made a 
mistake.276 
c. Vanished Presumption of Innocence 
“Innocence is a highly overrated commodity.” 277 
 
Many people have preconceived notions that those standing 
trial for criminal charges are ultimately guilty of the crime.278  This 
societal notion could be one of the reasons why people support 
Roger Goodell’s decisions to suspend players prior to legal 
adjudication.  The prime example of a league jumping the gun on 
a player’s conduct is the story of Green Bay Packers’ former wide 
receiver, James Lofton. 
In 1986, Lofton faced rape charges.279  Based solely on the 
charges, the NFL suspended Lofton for the last game of the regular 
season.280  In the off-season, however, Lofton was acquitted.281  The 
league acknowledged they made a mistake and backdated Lofton’s 
salary for the suspended game.282 
Situations of innocence similar to James Lofton’s remain a 
possibility.  Indeed, they could be Goodell’s worst nightmare, even 
 274. Quirk, supra note 72, at 118 (“In retrospect, the iron-handed banishment 
of the eight Black Sox players by Judge Landis served organized baseball well.  The 
exile of the Black Sox restored public confidence in the game.”). 
 275. See generally Morrissey, supra note 251 (defending Goodell’s enforcement 
of the conduct policy). 
 276. Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 109. 
 277. THE HURRICANE (Universal Pictures 1999). 
 278. See Mark Gillespie, Sympathies for Bryant Developing Along Racial Lines: 
Similar Patterns with O.J. Simpson Case, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 12, 2003, 
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/9019/Sympathies-Bryant-Developing-
Along-Racial-Lines.aspx (showing that 35-41% of those polled believed that Kobe 
Bryant was at least probably guilty of sexual assault in 2003). 
 279. See Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 109. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
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though he has made clear that he will suspend players regardless of 
legal determinations on guilt.283  In this event, the league will most 
likely pay a player his lost salary, or the player may sue the league 
for lost wages, bonuses, and possibly lost sponsorship money.284 
C.  Touchdown – Roger Goodell’s Rulings are the Best for the Business 
1. Economic Impact & Protection of Assets (Players) 
Currently the NFL is the most popular sport to watch in the 
world,285 which also makes it the world’s richest sports league.286  
The scale of wealth in the NFL ranges from the Dallas Cowboys 
(worth $1.5 billion) to the Minnesota Vikings (worth $782 
million).287  The economic success of the league is due largely to 
the enormous television contracts it receives by granting major 
television networks the exclusive right to televise NFL games.288  
The NFL currently has a $3.7 billion deal with CBS, a $4.3 billion 
deal with FOX, a $3.6 billion deal with NBC, and a $1.1 billion deal 
with ESPN.289  Each team receives an equal share of the television 
revenues, which the teams use in turn to pay the vast majority of 
player salaries.290 
The most valuable asset of a sports league is its players.  The 
quality of the league fluctuates according to the quality of its 
players, similar to stocks.  Sports leagues want high-quality players 
 283. Weisman, supra note 273, at 1C. 
 284. See Gibeaut, supra note 126, at 109 (“Those are the kinds of things you’ve 
got to look at when you’re disciplining players, says general counsel Dennis 
Curran, a former prosecutor.  You could end up owing a guy an entire year’s 
salary.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 285. See Michael K. Ozanian, The Business of Football: How ‘Bout Them Cowboys?, 
FORBES.com, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/business/2007/09/13/dallas-
cowboys-stadium-biz-07nfl_cx_mo_0913nflintro.html (“Although its television 
ratings have slipped over the past decade, the NFL still beats the daylights out of 
other prime-time programming, including every other sport.”). 
 286. Id.  The average NFL team is worth $957 million.  Id. 
 287. Monte Burke, Lifting a Loser: Michael Bidwill Vows to Transform the Cardinals 
from Laughingstock to Contender in the NFL, FORBES, Oct. 1, 2007, at 97. 
 288. See Ozanian, supra note 285 (discussing how the NFL’s television contracts 
fuel the league’s revenue). 
 289. Id. 
 290. See Pepper Brill, Major League Soccer or Major League Sham? Players Bring Suit 
to Bite the Hand That Feeds Them, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 585, 585 (1999) 
(explaining that player salaries capture a growing percentage of revenues earned 
through league television contracts). 
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competing at optimal levels to create attractive and popular games 
for the fans to watch.  Without high-quality players, minor sports 
leagues would spring up with similarly-skilled players to compete 
with the major sports leagues.  This would eventually force the 
major sports leagues to disintegrate into multiple smaller sports 
leagues competing for fan attraction. 
The current state of NFL competition, however, demands the 
highest quality players.  Quality includes not only on-the-field 
athletic prowess, including speed and strength, but also high 
quality players off the field.  The league holds the players to a high 
standard off the field because player conduct is representative of 
the league, their team, and its surrounding community.  This 
representation correlates with fan sentiment towards players and 
teams, which in turn affects the league’s economic success. 
Lowering the quality of players would create a domino effect.  
Lower quality players equal lower quality teams competing in less 
exciting games to watch.  Less fan interest equals less lucrative 
television contracts for the league, as well as sponsors. 
Numerous sponsors immediately dropped Michael Vick 
following his felony indictment for dogfighting;291 sponsors 
similarly dropped Kobe Bryant as a result of simply being charged 
with sexual assault.292  Imagine if the league did not suspend Vick, 
and let him play; it is likely that these sponsors would drop the 
Atlanta Falcons or possibly the league.  Also, consider the amount 
of people that were willing to stop attending Falcons’ games solely 
due to Vick’s involvement in dogfighting.293  The totality of these 
circumstances would be detrimental to the league’s image, which 
would create less economic success and decrease the money 
available for players’ salaries. 
 291. See Richard Sandomir, In Endorsements, No Athlete is a Sure Thing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at D5 (noting that Nike, Rawlings, and AirTran Airways 
dropped Vick as their pitchman and Upper Deck, and Donruss pulled Vick 
memorabilia from their product lines). 
 292. See id. (noting that Kobe lost nearly all his sponsors before the sexual 
assault charge against him was dropped). 
 293. See Tim Tucker, ‘Tarnished’ Club Tries to Rehab Brand, ATLANTA J. & CONST., 
Sept. 2, 2007, at F1 (noting that an unusually large number of Atlanta Falcons’ 
ticket holders were attempting to sell their tickets on the internet following the 
news of Vick’s alleged involvement in dogfighting). 
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2. Strictly Enforcing the Conduct Policy is in the NFL’s Best Interest 
The NFL has been called America’s new national pastime, 
America’s game, or the premier sports league in the United 
States.294  It is in the NFL’s best interests to protect this status 
through strictly enforcing its conduct policy.  First, the NFL laid the 
blueprint for economic success in sports in the 21st century.295  
Now, the NFL is setting the standard for discipline for other 
leagues to recognize and follow. 
NFL player misconduct was already out of hand by the mid to 
late 1990s,296 and when Goodell took office in 2006 he quickly 
recognized that the problem could ultimately cripple the sport’s 
image.  In April 2007, Goodell sent a warning shot to players 
during a news conference which laid the groundwork for the 
conduct policy.297  This foresight allowed Goodell to seamlessly 
handle the Michael Vick situation.  When the news broke regarding 
Vick’s involvement in illegal dogfighting, most people already knew 
what the commissioner was going to do under the league’s conduct 
policy.298  The league was able to take this possible hit to its image 
and respond forcefully because it had a strategy in place to handle 
this kind of situation.  The NFL will not tolerate this behavior, 
because whether players like it or not, children look up to NFL 
players as role models. 
a. Role Models 
It is impossible to calculate the effect that players have on 
society, especially on youth across America.  Children often 
emulate their favorite players in backyards and playgrounds while 
wearing their favorite players’ jerseys, possibly even Michael Vick’s 
jersey, which was among the NFL’s top-five selling jerseys since 
2001.299  The NFL is sending a clear message to these youth that if 
they want to play in the NFL they cannot get into trouble like 
 294. See MACCAMBRIDGE, supra note 107, at xiv–xix (describing the NFL’s 
passing of MLB as the most popular sport in the United States). 
 295. Id. 
 296. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 297. See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
 298. See Gary Myers, Suspension Suspense. Signs Point to NFL Banning Vick for 
Entire Season, DAILY NEWS (New York), July 29, 2007, at 73 (noting that most 
believed Goodell would suspend Vick). 
 299. William C. Rhoden, The Elusive Vick Takes His Hardest Hit, N.Y. TIMES, July 
20, 2007, at D2. 
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Michael Vick, “Pacman” Jones, Chris Henry, or “Tank” Johnson.  It 
is already bad enough for the NFL that parents have to explain to 
those children too young to understand why their favorite player is 
not on the field this year.  For those old enough to understand, it is 
a harsh realization to learn that their favorite player is going to be 
behind bars instead of on the playing field. 
b. Winning is not Everything 
Winning is like a drug for a lot of coaches: they will do almost 
anything for it.  Some coaches even desire players who have a 
history of fighting.300  Former NFL head coach Dick Vermeil once 
commented about the character of a player his team drafted, “I like 
the guys that don’t start it but finish it.  I like those kind of guys.  
This is a physical contact game.”301  The player Coach Vermeil was 
describing had recently been involved in the brutal beating of a 
fellow student.302  The player, along with three teammates, beat the 
student so badly it caused him paralysis and permanent brain 
damage.303  Today, NFL coaches must hesitate in their aggressive 
player scouting since Roger Goodell stepped in and decided 
winning is not everything. 
Now, coaches do not just want players to be fighters, they also 
want fighters who have not been in trouble with the law.304  This 
changes the way organizations put teams together.305  Extensive 
investigation into a player used to include a player’s strength, 
speed, quickness, and skills on the field.306  Now, teams with the 
 300. See, e.g., Mathew P. Barry, et. al., Judicial Opinion on The Criminality of Sports 
Violence in The United States, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 7 (2005) (stating 
that players are encouraged to engage in violent acts on the field both legal and 
illegal). 
 301. BENEDICT & YAEGER, supra note 3, at 4. 
 302. Id. at 2–3. 
 303. Id. 
 304. See Ken Murray, Teams Choose to be Pickier; New Policy Might Steer NFL Clubs 
Away from Troublemakers, BALT. SUN, Apr. 28, 2007, at 1C (discussing the Baltimore 
Ravens’ strategy of removing players off its draft board due to character issues). 
 305. See also Joel Michael Ugolini, Even a Violent Game Has its Limits: A Look at 
the NFL’s Responsibility for the Behavior of its Players, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 41, 48 (2007) 
(“teams have spent millions of dollars scouting, administering physical and 
psychological tests and performing background checks on potential draftees, as 
the question of a player’s character was never more of an issue than it is today” 
(quoting NFL Checks Draftees in Wake of Off Field Incidents: Spent Millions in 
Background Checks, Psychological Testing, SportsLawNews.com, Apr. 11, 2000, 
http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/Articles%202000/NFLDraftexams.htm)). 
 306. Id. 
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help of the league, must thoroughly research players in search of 
past, present, or future character flaws.307 
In preparation for last year’s NFL draft, the league 
administered a questionnaire to prospective players, which 
included a question regarding past use of marijuana. 308  The 
responses were supposed to be confidential, but unfortunately the 
media caught wind of some of the players’ responses.309  As a result 
of the mix-up, Goodell spoke with each player in person and 
apologized.310  This fault is not the only wrinkle the commissioner 
needs to iron-out. 
V. OFF-SEASON CONDITIONING - RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Punishment Disparities 
Despite the positive steps Goodell has taken, there is currently 
a disparity in the punishments he has handed down in the NFL.  
New England Patriots’ head coach Bill Belichek received a 
$500,000 fine for videotaping his opponents’ signals during a 
game, but Belichek was not suspended for the violation.311  The 
league suspended Dallas Cowboys’ assistant coach Wade Wilson for 
five games and fined him $100,000, however, for violating the 
league’s substance abuse policy.312  Wilson’s violation and 
Belichek’s are not the same, but one would have to assume that 
Wilson would rather pay the fine without the suspension, and all 
the players disciplined under the conduct policy would most likely 
desire a fine over a suspension.  Goodell could eliminate this type 
 307. See id. (noting that the NFL’s security department conducts background 
checks on the incoming draft class and makes the results available to the teams). 
 308. See Sam Farmer, Character will Count in the NFL Draft: With a Stricter Conduct 
Policy, Teams will be Cautious about Making the Right Decisions. Drug Use, Violence are 
Issues among Top Prospects, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at D3 (discussing the leak of 
information about draft prospects’ drug use). 
 309. Id. 
 310. See Megan Manfull, NFL DRAFT; Big Brother will be Watching Okoye; Older 
Sibling will be there for Texas’ Teen Pick, HOUSTON CHRON. (Tex.), Apr. 30, 2007, at 1 
(noting that Goodell personally met with the players to apologize for the 
information leak regarding the players’ past marijuana use). 
 311. See Ed Werder, Dallas Assistant Wants Goodell to Explain Belichek’s 
Punishment, ESPN.com, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3019472 
(explaining the punishments received by Belichek and the Patriots for the video-
tape scandal). 
 312. See id. (noting that Wilson violated the league’s substance abuse policy by 
buying human growth hormone, allegedly for his diabetic condition). 
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of disparity by implementing punishment guidelines, similar to 
sentencing guidelines used by judicial systems. 
B. Punishment Guidelines 
Expectations of punishment and overall fairness to players and 
coaches would increase if the league’s disciplinary policies included 
punishment guidelines.  The disciplinary policies already include 
the type of conduct punishable, but the length of suspensions and 
size of fines need to be more specific.  For example, the league 
could detail that a player committing a minor offense under the 
conduct policy is subject to a one to four game suspension with a 
fine of no more than $100,000.  For more serious offenses, a player 
would receive a suspension of four to eight games and a fine no 
larger than $250,000, and so forth.  The league could then detail 
non-exclusive lists of what constitutes minor and serious offenses.  
This would still grant the commissioner discretionary power to 
determine punishment, and at the same time players and coaches 
would not feel singled out because they would know what type of 
punishment to expect.313 
C. Neutral Arbitrator & Standard of Review 
The NFL commissioner as prosecutor, judge, and jury is a very 
dangerous concept, and negotiating with a commissioner to 
relinquish this broad power would be very difficult.  But, this broad 
power allows Roger Goodell to impose punishments as he sees fit.  
A dictatorial commissioner in the future, however, could abuse this 
power exponentially.  Therefore, allowing players and coaches to 
appeal their punishments to a neutral arbitrator would safeguard 
the league.  But to discipline players effectively, the league should 
also provide strict guidelines for arbitrators. 
Only if the NFL has punishment guidelines in place should it 
consider allowing players and coaches to appeal to a neutral 
arbitrator.  The arbitrator would then be able to evaluate 
punishments according to the guidelines already in place.  Also, 
the league should place strict limits on arbitrators by requiring 
 313. See also Ugolini, supra note 305, at 54 (“A detailed code of conduct with 
set penalties would put all players on notice of the consequences for their actions 
while avoiding the appearance of arbitrariness and favoritism that can accompany 
decisions made on a case by case basis.” (citing Note, Out of Bounds: Professional 
Sports Leagues and Domestic Violence, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1052 (1996)). 
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them to use an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review over a 
“just cause” standard of review used by other sports leagues. 
Arbitrators in the NBA and BASEBALL use a “just cause” 
standard of review.314  A more effective standard for the NFL would 
be “arbitrary and capricious.”  An “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard of review requires an arbitrator to look at whether a 
commissioner’s decision was founded on prejudice rather than 
reasons or facts.315  This standard would place a firm check on a 
commissioner’s disciplinary authority.  Additionally, the league 
could require a tripartite arbitration panel and even an appellate 
arbitration system.316  These checks and balances would further the 
level of fairness to players and coaches. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The NFL’s problem with player off-the-field misconduct went 
on for much too long.  Now, Roger Goodell is taking a stand 
against this misconduct and showing society that there is more to 
football than putting the best athlete on the playing field.  Now, 
not only must the players have talent, but also solid moral 
character. 
The NFL is able to raise the standards of player morality by 
strictly enforcing its conduct policy, something which all the other 
major sports fail to do.  The NFL is the only sport to retain the 
traditional model of powers granted to commissioners dating back 
to Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis.  While all other sports leagues 
hesitate to discipline players for conduct, the NFL is not holding 
back, regardless of legal adjudications.  The NFL believes its stance 
on conduct is in the best interests of the sport.  Not only is that 
stance the best for its business, but also legal and just. 
The NFL’s disciplinary system, however, still needs to iron out 
a few wrinkles.  Implementing punishment guidelines would 
eliminate the disparity in punishments, ease the commissioner’s 
judgment on severity, and increase player expectations.  Moreover, 
the NFL could alter its appeal process by allowing players to appeal 
 314. See supra Parts IV.A.4.a.i, IV.A.4.a.ii. 
 315. See Matthew McKelvey, Separating Sports and Real Life: How Professional 
Sports Leagues’ Collective Bargaining Agreements Keep Athletes Out of the Criminal Justice 
System, 27 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT  91, 115 (2001) (“[T]he 
appropriate standard of review should be whether the discipline imposed was 
arbitrary and capricious, not whether there was just cause for the discipline.”). 
 316. See id. at 123 (explaining the advantages of tripartite arbitration panels). 
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to a neutral arbitrator using an “arbitrary and capricious” standard 
of review. 
In conclusion, the impact on society is too detrimental to allow 
NFL players to play by the rules on the field, while they are not 
playing by the rules off it.  Our society is already one of the most 
violent in the world,317 and we do not want to send the wrong 
message to America’s youth.  A lasting impression left on kids 
should not include winning at all costs. 
“Success may result in winning, but winning does not 
necessarily mean you are a success.”318 
 
 317. See Kathleen Antonia, A Lesson Before Living – America Remains a Violent 
Society in which Stereotypes are too often Applied, HUMANIST, March 2001, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1374/is_2_61/ai_72274472 (noting that 
the United States remains one of the most violent and lawless societies in the 
world). 
 318. JOHN WOODEN & STEVE JAMISON, THE ESSENTIAL WOODEN: A LIFETIME OF 
LESSONS ON LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP xvi (2007). 
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